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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to lawyer-bashing, there is not much new under
the sun. Hostility toward lawyers is a perennial. Yet its expres-
sions vary greatly. There is a great cultural repertoire of anti-
lawyer observations and sentiments.1 At any time one or another
grievance may gain prominence. The changes in fashion are not
random, but part of wider changes in sensibilities. I propose to
examine the distinctive anti-lawyerism of the present to see what
it tells us about our legal system, our society and ourselves.
I. A TAXONOMY OF ANTI-LAWYER THEMES
Before taking up the current discontent with lawyers, let me set
out a very crude taxonomy of anti-lawyer themes. I have organized
some of the common themes into four clusters of related com-
plaints: that lawyers are (1) corrupters of discourse; (2) fomenters
of strife; (3) betrayers of trust; or (4) economic predators.2
1 See, e.g., Max Radin, TheAncient Grudge: A Study in the Public Relations of the Legal
Profession, 32 VA. L. REV. 734, 740-52 (1946) (summarizing historical sources of lawyer-
bashing from Ancient Greece to present).
2 These four clusters summarize most of the prevalent substantive gripes about lawyers.
However, the public discourse about lawyers includes several more general themes of
condemnation that focus not on their deeds but on their character and standing. One brands
lawyers as morally obtuse, lacking common decencies and deficient in common sentiments.
Another identifies them as objects of scorn, to be despised precisely because they are such
objects. While many of the prevalent anti-lawyer jokes refer to specific grievances about
lawyers, there are others that allude to their general moral deficiency or celebrate the shared
contempt for them (e.g., Q. *What do you call sixty thousand lawyers at the bottom of the
634 [Vol. 28:633
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Corrupters of Discourse: The first of my four clusters blames
lawyers for corrupting discourse by promoting needless complexity,
mystifying matters by jargon and formalities, robbing life's dealings
of their moral sense by recasting them in legal abstractions, and
offending common sense by casuistry that makes black appear
white and vice versa.
[Clasuistry is one of the diseases of a decadent
order.... It is lawyers who can take a plain recita-
tion of facts, turn it upside down, shake it, marinate
it with doubts, and trundle it upstairs to a higher
court for reconsideration.3
Fomenters of Strife: A second cluster portrays lawyers as
aggressive, competitive hired guns, unprincipled mercenaries who
foment strife and conflict by encouraging individual self-serving
and self-assertion rather than cooperative problem solving.
Examples are legion:
The entire legal profession ... [has] become so
mesmerized with the stimulation of the courtroom
contest that we tend to forget that we ought to be
healers-healers of conflicts. ... Healers, not
warriors.... Healers, not hired guns .... "
Lawyers have an economic interest in generating and
prolonging conflict.5
[Lawyers] encourage their clients to think with
selfish defensiveness, to imagine and prepare for the
worst from everyone else.6
sea? A. 'A good start.').
" William F. Buckley, Jr., Nobody Loves Lawyers Any More, WASH. STAR, Oct. 27, 1977,
at A15.
' Warren E. Burger, Annual Message on the Administration of Justice at the Midyear
Meeting of the American Bar Association 13 (Feb. 12, 1984) [hereinafter Burger, Annual
Message] (transcript on file with author).
'Robert J. Samuelson, Hustling the System, WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1992, at A17.
'Charles Peters, How Your Lawyer Does It, WASH. MONTHLY, Feb. 1974, at 33, 37.
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And then there is the old joke about the town with one lawyer who
was starving, but when a second lawyer settled there, they both
prospered.
Betrayers of Trust: A third cluster damns lawyers as betrayers
of trust: they are opportunistic, manipulative, self-serving
deceivers who, under color of pursuing large public responsibilities,
take advantage not only of hapless opponents but of clients who
entrust their fortunes to them.
An ancient, nearly blind old woman retained the
local lawyer to draft her last will and testament, for
which he charged her two hundred dollars. As she
rose to leave, she took the money out of her purse
and handed it over, enclosing a third hundred-dollar
bill by mistake. Immediately the attorney realized
he was faced with a crushing ethical question:
Should he tell his partner?7
Economic Predators: Finally, lawyers are economic predators;
they are greedy, money-driven monopolists, who levy a tariff on
matters of common right. They are parasitic rent-seekers who do
not really produce anything, but merely batten on the productive
members of society, often in alliance with the undeserving-oppor-
tunistic malingerers in some versions, the privileged and powerful
in others.
There's a reason people hate lawyers ... It's be-
cause they have a monopoly on what rightfully
belongs to everyone.'
These clusters overlap and reinforce each other: for example,
mystification helps lawyers manipulate the unwary and shield their
monopoly. Lawyers betray their clients by fomenting needless
7 Versions of this story may be found in virtually any collection of lawyerjokes. This one
is taken from BLANCHE KNoTT, TRULY TASTELESS LAWYER JOKES 73 (1990).
" Michael Castleman, Just Say Nolo, CAL. LAWYER, Aug. 1992, at 182, 184 (quoting Nolo
Press founder Jake Warner).
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conflict, and the resulting economic burdens directly benefit
lawyers. And so on.
Each of these clusters is a composite, consisting of a number of
specific and partially overlapping complaints. In each cluster, there
is a range from complaints about mistreatment of specific individu-
als (clients, opponents) to wrongdoing that in the aggregate has
larger public consequences. Thus, a lawyer can be accused of
hoodwinking a client by mystification, or propelling that client into
an unnecessary fight, or betraying that client's interest for self-
serving reasons, or charging that client excessively for his services.
These grievances are the private, individual versions of the four
clusters. On the other hand, the complaint might be that lawyers'
jargon and mystification obscure public understanding and
diminish citizen participation; or that lawyer-induced excessive
adversariness makes public life nasty and wasteful; or that lawyers
misuse their authority to sustain illegitimate privilege and power;
or, finally, that lawyers' exploitation of their monopoly is a drain on
the economy, reducing growth and decreasing competitiveness.
These are the aggregate, public, and systemic versions of the four
clusters.
Each of these clusters points to the dark side of things that may
otherwise appear as virtues or at least useful qualities of lawyers.
In the sins of discourse we can recognize the inventiveness of
lawyers and their obsession with precision and relevance. Foment-
ing conflict mirrors the lawyer's zealous advocacy and insistence on
vindicating rights. In economic predation, we see appreciation of
the lawyer's prowess as an agent of redistribution. The betrayal
complaint proclaims regard for the lawyer as an ally coupled with
fear and resentment that he is an undependable ally. The things
for which lawyers are despised are closely related to the things for
which they are esteemed.9
I Seegenerally Robert C. Post, On the PopularImage of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark
Glass, 75 CAL. L. REv. 379 (1987) (exploring the organization of "profoundly contradictory"
popular attitudes toward lawyers). See also Marvin W. Mindes, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A
Report on the Lawyer Image, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 177, 211 (empirically documenting
tension among contradictory images of lawyers) ('[The lawyer finds himself in a conflicted
world in which one must be both Tricky and Helpful to maximize admiration, while being
Helpful requires that one is not Tricky and being Tricky requires that one is not Helpful.").
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I1. THE "PUBLIC JUSTICE" CRITIQUE
To appreciate the distinctiveness of the current discourse about
lawyers, it is useful to look back to the pre-Reagan years. FiMeen
years ago, President Jimmy Carter took the occasion of the 100th
Anniversary dinner of the Los Angeles Bar Association to deliver
a critique of the legal system.1" Beginning with an excerpt from
Bleak House, President Carter excoriated delay, "excessive litiga-
tion and legal featherbedding,"1' and chastised lawyers for
aggravating rather than resolving conflict. We have heard much
in recent years about these lawyer vices, but in Carter's critique
these complaints were interwoven with another set of themes that
have been notably absent from more recent presidential rhetoric
about the legal system. President Carter declared that legal
services were, more than any resource in our society, "wastefully
[and] unfairly distributed."' Lawyers were particularly to blame
for failing to make justice "blind to rank, power and position."3
He deplored that "lawyers of great influence and prestige led the
fight against civil rights and economic justice."1' Devoted to the
service of dominant groups, lawyers had failed to discharge their
"heavy obligation to serve the ends of true justice."'" He called
upon them to release "the enormous potential for good within an
aroused legal profession."16 In short, lawyers had fallen woefully
short of their calling to be votaries of justice in an imperfect world.
He called on them to embrace the theme of "Access to Justice,"
which was the official theme of the American Bar Association for
1978.17 Although the tones were critical, the song was one of
optimism and hope: rededication to their high calling combined
with institutional redesign could vindicate the promise of connect-
10 President James E. Carter, Address at the 100th Anniversary Dinner of the Los
Angeles Bar Association (May 4, 1978), reprinted in President Carter's Attack on Lawyers,
President Spann's Respons, and the Chief Justice Burger's Remarks, 64 A.B.A. J. 840 (1978)
[hereinafter Carter's Attack on Lawyers].
11Carter's Attack on Lawyers, supra note 10, at 842.
1 Id.
Id. at 843.14Id. at 842.
Ild.
1 Id.
17 Id. at 844.
[Vol. 28:633638
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ing law to pursuit of a just society."8 Needless to say, the Presi-
dent's observations did not get a warm reception from the bar.19
The general press was quite unfavorable.'o But the President's
criticism of the bar met with general public approval.21
aId. at 846. Carter's address is the direct descendant of an unheralded Law Day speech
at the University of Georgia School of Law, delivered four years earlier, when he was
Governor of Georgia. In that speech, he traced his understanding about justice and 'what's
right and wrong in this society" to reading Reinhold Neibuhr and listening to the songs of
Bob Dylan. Governor James E. Carter, Address at The University of Georgia School of Law,
Law Day (1975) in ADDRESES OF JIMMY CARTER (JAMES EARL CARTER), GOVERNOR OF
GEORGIA, 1971-1975, at 261 (Ben W. Fortson, Jr., Sec. of State, ed., 1975). Cataloging the
injustices of the legal system, he chastised lawyers for tolerating injustice, lacking fire to
improve the system of which they were part, avoiding the obligation to "restore equity and
justice and to preserve or enhance it," and being distracted from the pursuit of justice into
self-serving concern for their own well-being and authority. Id. He closed with the
reflection, echoed four years later, that the State could be transformed if the body of
attorneys were deeply committed to abolish the inequities of the system. Id. Apparently the
speech was from notes and there is no text. The version that appears in his book of
addresses was apparently reconstructed from a tape recording.
Fortuitously, the audience that day included gonzo journalist Hunter Thompson, who
reports Carter telling him in 1976, *[That was probably the beat speech I ever made.'
Hunter S. Thompson, Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '76, Third Rate Romance,
Low Rent Rendezvous, ROLLING STONE, June 3, 1976, at 54, 64. Viewing it as 'the heaviest
and most eloquent thing I have ever heard from the mouth of a politician," Thompson
extended an enthusiastic endorsement of Carter's candidacy for the Democratic presidential
nomination. Id.
' Tom Goldstein, Carter's Attack on Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,1978, at 11 ('[Lleading
lawyers around the country reacted with anger, bitterness, frustration and sadness yesterday
to President Carter's assertion that the legal profession has been an impediment to social
justice.) On behalf of the American Bar Association, its President, William B. Spann,
responded that 'we disagree sharply with the implications of the president's remarks" and
accused him of"tak[ing] the popular course of attacking the professions" to distract attention
from foreign problems, inflation, and his political vulnerability. Carter's Attack on Lawyers,
supra note 10, at 841. In President Spann's view, Carter's speech was a simplistic
distraction from the ceaseless and constructive efforts of lawyers to solve the problems of the
justice system. Id.; see also 124 CONG. REC. H13939 (daily ed. May 16, 1978) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier) (characterizing President's remarks as harsh and inaccurate).
* E.g., The Law's Delay, WALL ST. J., May 10,1978, at 24 (noting that since "Washington
itself has become the fountainhead of unnecessary laws and litigation," the President should
spend 9less time lashing out at lawyers in general and more time asking the government's
lawyers just what it is they are trying to do"); Mr. Carter's Class Struggle, WASH. POST, May
7, 1978, at C6 (dismissing President's remarks as 'unfocused resentmen").
21 Two-thirds of a national sample of registered voters polled by Yankelovich, Skelly and
White thought the President's criticism of the legal profession was fair. Roper Center, Public
Opinion Online, 1989, available in LEXIS, News, Arcnwa Library (accession no. 0132789).
A Roper poll of a national sample of adults found 53% who thought his criticisms were
justified and another 16% who thought them partly justified. Id. (accession no. 0116933).
The public was equally critical of doctors, whom Carter criticized in responding to questions
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The organizing theme of the Carter critique was betrayal of trust.
President Carter's speech was the culmination of a decade of
attacks on lawyers for self-serving alliance with the powerful,
attacks that acquired added credibility from the heavy represen-
tation of lawyers among the Watergate villains.22 Let me mention
just a few of the landmarks of that trail. In a much cited 1967
article entitled "The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game,"
Abraham Blumburg indicted criminal lawyers for allowing them-
selves to become co-opted by the court organization so that they
became "double agent[s]" cynically manipulating their clients.2
In his 1968 best seller, The Trouble With Lawyers, Murray Teigh
Bloom recounted the various ethical lapses of lawyers who abuse
their clients by self-serving behavior.2' In a 1977 Law Day
address, the Chief Judge of New York's Court of Appeals warned
that lawyers were increasingly motivated by "self interest rather
than social responsibility."'
Other critics recast the betrayal theme in terms of large public
interests rather than individual lawyer-client relations.2 In his
highly regarded 1976 history, Unequal Justice, Jerold Auerbach
condemned the elite of the legal profession for its subservience to
the day after his lawyer speech, as of lawyers. Id. (accession no. 0132788).
Carter was not entirely lacking in elite support. In addition to the figures discussed below,
his critique was defended by his Secretary of State, who called for 'innovative approaches
for making justice available for all." Peter Kihss, Vance, at Fordham Law Graduation, Calls
for Innovative' Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1978, at 9. Admiral Hyman J. Rickover also
supported the President, attacking lawyers for 'making a great negative contribution to our
defense.* Bernard Weinraub, RickoverAsertLawyers' Tactics Hinder Military, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1979, at 22.
'" See, e.g., John W. Sheppard, Ethics, 49 FLA. B.J. 184 (1975) ("With the overflow of
Watergate and the revelation that a great majority of the offenders were members of the
legal profession, the public image of the Bar seems to have reached a low ebb.... There
seems to be a rising tide of resentment to the entire profession who [sic] guides the legal
system in our country.").
" Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Cooptation of a
Profession, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 15 (1967).
2MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968).
' Linda Greenhouse, Breitel Tells Lawyers that Greed is Undermining Their Profesion,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1977, at .1 (quoting New York State Court of Appeals Chief Justice
Charles Breitel).
I See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTIcE (1980) (critiquing public justice and
faulting lawyers for serving their clients with such obdurate partisanship as to ecipse their
duties to the wider system of justice). Frankel was a member of the Kutak Commission,
discussed infra note 36.
640 [Vol. 28:633
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the powerful and privileged, and its failure to implement equal
justice.27 That year at the American Bar Association convention,
Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman, Jr. "accused the
organized bar... of having 'failed the American public' by turning
its back on people unable to afford high-priced lawyers." 8  In
response, Chesterfield Smith, a former ABA president, called for
a system of dues going to public interest law; and a
change in the profession's ethical canons to require
at least some public interest work by each lawyer.
"You need someone who can represent the general
interest," he said.'
Ralph Nader attacked the "endemic malaise" of lawyers' acquiesc-
ing in a maldistribution of their services that fortified powerful
interests."q Lawyers evaded the duties to the broader public that
flowed from their status as officers of the court and evaded their
obligation to secure justice by hiding behind canons of behavior
that protected their self-interest.31 Similarly, Jethro K. Lieber-
man's 1978 critique argued that the "unethical ethics" of the legal
profession undermined its role as a "public profession."3
2
The "public interest law' and "access to justice" '& movements
that flourished during the 1970s, seeking to give voice to unrep-
JEROLD S. AUERBAcH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA (1992).
" Leley Oelsner, Coleman Asserts Bar Fails Public, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1976, at 25
(quoting Secretary of Transportation William Coleman).
"Id. (quoting former ABA President Chesterfield Smith).
30 Ralph Nader, Overview to VERDICTS ON LAWYERS vii, viii (Ralph Nader and Mark
Green eds., 1976).
" Id. at i3.
3 JETHRO K LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT (1978).
3 See generally BURTON A. WEISBROD, JOEL F. HANDLER & NEIL K KOMESAR, PUBLIC
INTEREST LAw: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978) (providing economic and
institutional analysis of public interest movement); COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW,
BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA (1976)
(discussing potential approaches to funding public interest law).
"See generally the multi-volume ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Mauro Cappelletti, ed., 1978);
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE SYSTEM (Mauro Cappelletti, ed., 1981).
1994]
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resented groups and to enlarge the modalities for securing justice,
called for lawyers to embrace these neglected responsibilities.
Some adherents of the public justice critique called for formation of
a "National Legal Service" to make legal services freely available
to all. 5
The public justice critique culminated in the work of the Kutak
Commission, set up in 1977 to revise the rules of ethical conduct for
lawyers.' The major theme of the new Model Rules proposed by
the Commission was enlargement of the public duties of lawyers
and limitation of their license for adversary combat. 7 The
Commission sought to accentuate the duties of lawyers that
transcended their responsibilities to clients-for example, by
limiting confidentiality to enable lawyers to blow the whistle on
client wrongdoing, imposing a duty of fairness in negotiations by
requiring disclosure of material facts, and requiring lawyers to
devote a portion of their time to pro bono publico work.'5 The
Commission's proposals aroused fierce opposition from various
sectors of the bar and were vitiated at a series of ABA meetings in
1982 and 1983.39 Notwithstanding, echoes of the public justice
26Eg., FRANKEL, supra note 26, at 124; PHILIP M. STERN, LAWYFS ON TRIAL 199 (1980).
"The American Bar Association's Special Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards was known as the Kutak Commission. The impetus for a new ethics code came
in part from the damage to the bar's public image occasioned by Watergate. See William B.
Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, BAR LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1977,
at 2 (relating ABA President's charge to Kutak Commission).
' Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
"Id.
Gerald J. Clark, Fear and Loathing in New Orleans: The Sorry Fate of the Kutak
Commission's Rules, 17 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 79, 85 (1983). Ted Schneyer points out that,
although a number of the Commission's major innovations were jettisoned, the Model Rules
in many ways accommodated elements of the public justice critique:
They... invite lawyers... to take their own values into account. They
permit lawyers to refuse on moral grounds to represent would-be clients;
authorize lawyers to *limit the objectives" of representation by excluding
aims they find"repugnant or imprudent!; and in a remarkable concession
to lawyers' sensibilities allow them to withdraw whenever "a client
insists upon pursuing an objective the lawyer considers repugnant or
imprudent!--even if the client's interest will be "adversely affected" by
the withdrawall
Schneyer, supra note 37, at 736 (footnotes omitted).
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critique are audible from time to time in bar precincts. 40
The dominant pre-Reagan critique was that lawyers were
blameworthy for failing to meet their professional obligations. The
relatively apolitical Murray Teigh Bloom focused on the failure of
lawyers to fulfill their obligations to clients. The broader, more
political versions of Carter, Auerbach, and Nader emphasized
lawyers' deflection from promotion ofjustice due to their co-optation
by the powerful. In each case, it is lawyers' misdeeds and omis-
sions that attract reproach, not the legal enterprise as such.
H. CONTEMPORARY LAWYER-BASHING
At the very time that the notion of justice underserved by its
disloyal servants was being elaborated, other currents were
reshaping attitudes toward the state of the civil justice system.
Eminent judges, lawyers, and academics opined that American
society was suffering from an excess of law in the form of "legal
pollution" or a "litigation explosion." The popular press echoed this
concern, reporting that "Americans in all walks of life are being
buried under an avalanche of lawsuits." 1 The Chief Justice of the
United States criticized lawyers for commercialism, for incompe-
tence, and for excessive adversariness that produced court conges-
tion and runaway litigation.42 He mounted a broad attack aimed
at curtailing litigation and replacing adversarial confrontation by
40 Thus, in the mid-1980., the ABA's Commission on Professionalism recommended:
A far greater emphasis must be placed by the Bar on the role of the
lawyer as both an officer of the court and, more broadly, as an officer of
the system of justice.... [L]awyers must avoid identifying too closely
with their clients.
ABACOMMIS8IONONPROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE (1986) [hereinafter
STANLEY REPORT] (known as the Stanley Report, for Chair Justin Stanley).
41 Why Everybody il Suing Everybody, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 1978, at 50.
" Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic
Anticipation, Address delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976)
[known as the Pound Conference, after Roscoe Pound's 1906 address of the same title. Like
Pound, his 1976 successors propounded "popular perceptions unaided by any discernable
consultation of the broader public.].
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a "better way.'"3
Concern about mounting costs and expanding frontiers of liability
led to sustained campaigns for "tort reform."' The thrust for
increased "access to justice' 5 was transformed from a desire to
multiply the paths to justice to a movement to curtail litigation by
diverting disputes into alternative dispute resolution.' Typically,
the performance of these alternatives was assessed in terms of
efficiency rather than superior justice.
By the mid-1980s, the discourse about lawyers and civil justice
in America was dominated by what I call the "jaundiced view." Our
civil justice system was widely condemned as pathological and
destructive, producing untold harm. A series of factoids or macro-
anecdotes about litigation became the received wisdom: America
I These concerns antedate Carter's 1978 speech. Burger's Address to the 1976 Pound
Conference contains faint echoes of the public justice critique in the Chief Justice's
observation of "the loss of public confidence caused by lawyers' using the courts for their own
ends rather than with a consideration of the public interest." Id. But the predominant
theme of the Chief Justice's address is not a shortage ofjustice, but surfeit of law. Id. at 91.
Just a year later, the Chief Justice was warning that "unless we devise substitutes for the
courtroom processes--and do so quickly-we may well be on our way to a society overrun by
hordes of lawyers, hungry as locusts, and brigades of judges in numbers never before
contemplated." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Remarks at the American Bar Association
Minor Disputes Resolution Conference (May 27, 1977).
'4 See generally Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, 'Off to the Races?." The 1980s Tort Crisis
and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207 (1990); Eliot Martin Blake, Comment,
Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information
Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401 (1988).
, See generally ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 34; ACCESS TO JuSTICE AND THE WELFARE
SYSTEM, supra note 34.
""Alternatives" were very much part of the Access to Justice repertoire. The General
Report of the great multi-volume compendium on Access to Justice includes a section on
*Devising Alternative Methods to Decide Legal Claims" that discusses arbitration,
conciliation, and settlement. Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The
Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, A General Report, in 1 ACCESS To JUSTICE,
supra note 45, at 3,59-107; se also Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementa-
ry, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice, 26 STANFORD L. REV. 1 (1973) (analyzing
concept of decentralized criminal justice system as means to provide access to justice);
Richard Danzig & Michael J. Lowy, Everyday Disputes and Mediation in the United States:
A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 675, 685-87 (1975) (calling for
supplementation of ineffective court system by informal, non-coercive 'community moot?).
Although these themes of enlarging justice occasionally surface in current discourse on
alternatives, they are vastly overshadowed by concerns to expedite case processing, deflect
institutional burdens, and curtail exposure to liability. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing
Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR," 19
FI ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) (providing eloquent response to this shift in concerns).
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is the most litigious society in the course of all human history;
Americans sue at the drop of a hat; the courts are brimming over
with frivolous lawsuits; resort to courts is a first rather than a last
resort; runaway juries make capricious awards to undeserving
claimants; immense punitive damage awards are routine; litigation
is undermining our ability to compete economically.""
Although a litigious populace and activist judges were blamed,
lawyers, as the promoters, beneficiaries, and protectors of this
pathological system, were prominent among the culprits. Then, in
the early 1990s, attacks on lawyers escalated sharply. Older
themes of suspicion of and disdain for lawyers reappeared in new
guises.
A. TOO MANY LAWYERS
It is widely believed that the United States is cursed with a
population of lawyers that is vastly disproportionate to any possible
usefulness. This notion achieved extraordinary prominence in
August 1991, when Vice President Quayle ended his speech on the
wrongs of our legal system with the rhetorical question, "Does
America really need 70% of the world's lawyers?""8
'
7 These larger assertions about the civil justice system were embodied in oft-related
atrocity stories about outrageous claims and monstrous decisions. See Stephen Daniels, The
Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform, 52 LAw & CONTEmp.
PoBs. 269,292-97 (1989); Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis, STUD.
IN L. POL. & Soc'Y 95,104-08 (1991); Steven Brill & James Lyons, The Not-so-Simple Crisis,
AM. LAW., May 1, 1986, at 1; Fred Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stories Never Die, NATL L.J.,
Feb. 16, 1987, at 39.
" The Council on Competitiveness did not include the 70% figure in its Agenda,
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON CMPEIrVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA
(1991), but apparently there had been some consideration of it in the preparation of the Vice
President's August 13 speech, for a week earlier *a Quayle spokesman" was reported as
having "noted that the United States has 70 percent of the world's lawyers, and that the
rising tide of litigation s a burden on our economy.'" Saundra Torry, BCCI Scandal a
Windfall for Attorneys Unlike Any Other, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1991, at F5. The drafters
of the Council's Agenda had reason to be aware that seventy percent was a falsehood. On
page one of the Agenda, there is an approving reference to, but not citation for, 'a recent
report by a Professor of Finance at the University of Texas ... [that] estimated that the
average lawyer takes $1 million a year from the country's output of goods and services.* The
report referred to is chapter eight of STEPHEN P. MAGER ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND
ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY 111-21 (1989). That source contains an incomplete listing of
the number of lawyers in some 34 countries as of 1983. Id. at 120-21. Even this inadequate
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The origins of this seventy percent figure are mysterious. The
notion that the United States had "two thirds of the world's
lawyers" had surfaced a decade earlier, although it had no ascer-
tainable origin in research-scholarly, journalistic or otherwise."
This item was retailed by Chief Justice Burger as part of his
indictment of litigious America, and was repeated by a few judges
and law school deans, but gained no currency. in wider circles.'
A few years later, in contrast, the Vice President's seventy percent
figure was immediately parroted by many political figures and
media experts.51 It was eventually inscribed in the 1992 Republi-
enumeration showed American lawyers as just 45% of the total. Id. One can conclude that
the Council staff either did not examine the source they approvingly cite, or that they were
aware that there was good reason to believe the seventy percent figure was spurious.
'Among the earliest sightings was a news magazine report that '[t]he U.S. has 610,000
lawyers, two thirds of the world's total .... About 70 percent are in private practice." The
Pervasive Influence ofLawyers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 1, 1982, at 55. [Could this
be the origin of the 70% figure?] A few months earlier, James Spensley, a lecturer at the
University of Denver Law School, was quoted as saying *[Tlhe U.S. has become the world's
most litigious society, employing over two thirds of the world's lawyer. David F. Salisbury,
Colorado's Quality ofLife Fades in a Changing West, CHRISTIAN Sm. MONITOR, July 30, 1982,
at 4.
so See Burger, Annual Message, supra note 4. The Chief Justice stated: "lt has been
reported that about two-thirds of all the lawyers in the world are in the United States and
of those, one-third have come into practice in the past five years.* Id. A very similar item
appeared a few months earlier in a contribution to Legal Times by New York lawyer Peter
Megargee Brown, who stated that "two-thirds of all the lawyers in the world are in the
United States. One-third of all lawyers in this country have been in practice less than five
years." Peter Megargee Brown, Profession Endangered by Rush to Business Ethic, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1983, at 10.
The Chief Justice's "two-thirds observation was taken as factual by a sympathetic
Washington Post. Bench to Bar: Shape Up, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1984, at A18. It was
subsequently used by Justice O'Connor and others. Milly McLean, UPI, Apr. 9, 1984,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT File. Similarly, a law school dean noted in an
op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that "two-thirds of the world's lawyers now practice in this
country, and one-third of these were graduated during the past five years.' Ernest Gellhorn,
Too Much Law, Too Many Lawyers, Not Enough Justice, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1984, at 28.
This item became part of the speeches of Governor Lamm of Colorado about America's
descent to doom. See, e.g., Richard W. Larsen, Time to Restore Logic to Public Policies,
SEATLE TIMES, Oct. 14,1990, atA18,John J. Sanko, GovrnorAddresses Businessmen, UPI,
Nov. 3, 1983, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPSTAT File.
" For example, cabinet members Mossbacher and Sullivan, and Senators Dole,
McConnell, and Grassley, among many others. See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The
Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. L. REV. 77 (1993) [hereinafter Galanter, News
from Nowhere]. This figure was also solemnly reported as fact by several media experts,
such as David Gergen. David Gergen,America'sLegalMess, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
19, 1991, at 72. Likewise, William Buckley noted that Quayle's speech 'reminded us that
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can platform, reappeared in Vice President Quayle's acceptance
speech, and surfaced during the presidential campaign.
Counting lawyers cross-nationally is a daunting undertaking,
plagued by poor data and a bushel of apples and oranges problems.
However these problems are resolved, it is clear that the seventy
percent figure is very far from the mark. An informed guess would
be something less than half of that. Counting conservatively,
American lawyers probably make up somewhere between twenty-
five and thirty-five percent of all the world's lawyers, using that
term to refer to all those in jobs that American lawyers do (includ-
ing judges, prosecutors, government lawyers and in-house corporate
lawyers).,2
But "seventy percent" is not just a matter of mistaken statistics.
Seventy percent is an accusation of monstrous disproportion. It
suggests that America has departed from the normal model of
development and that the national body is disfigured by a cancer-
ous excrescence that requires to be excised.' America needs to be
"de-lawyered.'
B. THE DRAG ON THE ECONOMY
Why is having all these lawyers such a bad thing? Contemporary
critics concur on one central charge: these lawyers are a drag on
the economy. This takes several forms. First, legal careers simply
70 percent of the lawyers in the world are American.' William Buckley, Invisible Hand
Tripped Up by Burden of Lawyer Glut, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 30, 1991, at A19. In
the May, 1992 issue of Commentary, Francis Fukuyama wrote that 'there is something
wrong with an economy that employs 70 percent of the world's lawyers." Paul L. Berger et
al., Is America on the Way Down? (Round Two), COMMENTARY, May 1992, at 20, 21.
u See Galanter, News from Nowhere, supra note 51, at 79 n.10 (presenting calculation
and documentation).
" xI don't think it is healthy for the United State. to have 70 percent of the world's
lawyers. We have only 5 percent of the world's population. There ought to be a more
equitable balance between population and the number of lawyers.' Press Conference with
Vice President J. Danforth Quayle, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, FEDNEW File [hereinafter Vice President Quayle, Press Conference].
"Gergen, supra note 51, at 72. 'Clearly, we need to de-lawyer our society.' Id.
Governor Lamm had various proposals to 'de-lawyer" the American system. See Larson,
supra note 50, at A18.
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divert high grade talent into unproductive work.s Second, not
only are these scarce talents squandered, but they are transformed
into enemies of productivity. The principal intellectual foundation
for the view that lawyers hurt the economy is the work of Universi-
ty of Texas finance professor Stephen Magee. Magee has tried to
show that the countries with the highest lawyer populations"
suffer from impaired economic growth. Magee's conclusion is
wrong; its first version was shown to be false, 7 and its latest
version is no stronger. The best research on the topic reaches
entirely different conclusions.'
In Magee's first take on this issue, he claimed that all lawyers
are economically destructive." Apart from being silly on its face,
that conclusion resulted from an empirical analysis containing
major methodological errors. His analysis compared the lawyer
populations and economic growth rates of thirty-four countries and
concluded that the more lawyers a country has, the lower is its rate
of growth.'o That analysis is shot through with problems. First,
Magee relied on poor lawyer data-his lawyer figures for several
countries were substantially incorrect. Second, he employed a
peculiar research design that used lawyer data in 1983 to predict
" The nuanced version of this diversion argument was put forward in 1983 by Derek Bok.
Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System, 85(5) HARV. MAG. 38 (1983). He spoke of *a massive
diversion of exceptional talent into pursuits that often add little to the growth of the
economy, the pursuit of culture, or the enhancement of the human spirit." Id. at 41. Like
Carter and unlike many later critics, Bok was also concerned with issues of maldistribution
of law: "[There is far too much law for those who can afford it and far too little for those
who cannot.' Id. at 38-39. The "other great problem of our legal system [is] lack of access
for the poor and the middle class." Id. at 41.
" In Magee's research, the lawyer population is measured as a ratio to either doctors or
white collar workers, which are both taken as to reflect the size of the productive work force
of a society.
"' Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's 1I01 All the Economists: An Empirical
Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70
TEX L. REV. 645 (1992) [hereinafter Cross, First Thing].
" Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth? 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 585
(1992) [hereinafter Epp, Do Lawyers]; Charles I. Epp, Toward New Research on Lawyers and
the Economy, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 695 (1992) [hereinafter Epp, New Research]; Cross,
First Thing, supra note 57.
"Stephen P. Magee, The Invisible Foot and the Waste of Nations: Lawyers as Negatie
Externalities, in STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL, BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS POuCY




economic growth from 1960 to 1985--even though his own figures
showed that the number of lawyers in 1983 bore little relation to
the number in 1960. Third, Magee's research did not take into
account ("control for") any other known influences on economic
growth, including such powerful influences as a country's level of
political instability. Finally, the conclusion resulted in large part
from the coincidence of low economic growth rates and high lawyer
populations in two "outliers" (Argentina and Nepal), whose legal
systems and economies bear little relation to our own.
After critics pointed out those failings, Magee refurbished his
research and now claims that only lawyers above a certain optimal
number hurt an economy. 1 Stated that simply, the view has an
intuitive plausibility: surely if all Americans were lawyers and did
nothing else, our economy would have problems. Magee's leap to
the conclusion that there are, in fact, too many lawyers in the
United States is a different matter.
Like the first version, Magee's latest research is deeply flawed,
and probably would not merit discussion were it not getting so
much publicity. In attempting to determine the economic effect of
lawyers, he now takes into account known influences on economic
growth.' But his conclusions still rely primarily on 1983 lawyer
data to predict prior economic growth, and they still rest on flawed
lawyer data. For example, he estimates that there are 43,100
lawyers in West Germany; but if we include not only lawyers in
private practice but also government lawyers, corporate lawyers,
judges and law teachers-all included in the United States lawyer
count-the total number of German lawyers in 1985 was
115,900.63 That produces a lawyer-to-white-collar worker ratio of
twenty-nine per thousand, not the eleven per thousand that
Professor Magee asserts. Inaccuracies of this magnitude are not
minor details. In his most recent response to these criticisms, he
declares that lawyer data corrected for such errors still support his
"1 According to Magee's calculations, the optimal number in 1983 was 23 lawyers per
1,000 white collar workers; the U.S. had about 38/1,000 in that year. Stephen P. Magee,
Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at A17.
Id.
'David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany:
Implementation of a Rechtutaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1807 (1988).
6491994]
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
conclusion." But that is true only if the lawyer data are used to
"predict" prior economic growth-an unjustifiable research strategy;
the same data contradict Magee's results when they are employed
to analyze subsequent economic growth." In addition, Magee's
latest conclusion, like his earlier one, rests on the coincidence of
slow growth and high lawyer populations in a few idiosyncratic
countries, now Uruguay and Chile.
As a corollary, Magee claims that lawyers have captured the
United States political system, evidenced by the fact that forty-two
percent of United States Representatives and sixty-one percent of
Senators are lawyers.' But that hardly means the legal profes-
sion has captured the political system: those lawyers in Congress
are Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives,
proponents of regulation and enemies of regulation. As a bloc, they
share no discernible interest; a range of studies finds no difference
between the voting patterns of lawyer-legislators and those of
nonlawyer-legislators. 7
Careful analyses of the effect of lawyers on the economy find no
support for the Magee hypothesis; indeed, they find that lawyers
have no significant effect at all on overall economic growth.' The
Magee analysis rests on many of the familiar but unproven
contentions about the civil justice system. He assumes that the
"Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number ofLawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 667 (1992). In that article, Magee also presents statistical results using lawyer data
for a number of countries from 1975. Epp shows that those results are very tenuous,
depending on one outlier (the United States); if that outlier is removed from the sample of
countries, Magee's discovered relationship between lawyers and growth disappears. Yet one
country cannot justifiably be used as the basis for statistical conclusions. Epp demonstrates
that Magee's 1975 lawyer data are "largely his own creation" and are 'no better than a
guess." Epp, New Research, supra note 58, at 702.
"E.g., Epp, Do Lawyers, supra note 58; Epp, New Research, supra note 58.
"Magee, supra note 64, at 675.
The research on lawyers in legislative bodies is cited by Epp. He finds "It]he most
persuasive explanations for the overrepresentation of lawyers in U.S. legislatures have
nothing to do with the legal profession's ostensible interest in capturing the legislative
process. Those explanations relate to the structure of political recruitment in the United
States, where parties are weak and not class-based, and where entrepreneurial skills are
important for political office, and to the advantage legislative service provides for lawyers
seeking to advance their careers within the legal bureaucracy." Epp, Do Lawyers, supra note
58, at 590.
" E.g., Epp, Do Lawyers, supra note 58; Epp, New Research, supra note 58; Cross, First
Thing, supra note 57.
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presence of "excess" lawyers is evidenced by the presence of
"predatory" litigation, as distinguished from justified or beneficial
litigation. But he provides no evidence of the frequency of bad
litigation that is independent of the conclusion that there are too
many lawyers.
Notwithstanding the absence of reliable evidence, Magee--or at
least his point about the economic predation of lawyers-is widely
believed by those who should know better. Thus a former chair of
the President's Council of Economic Advisors, lamenting slow
growth, says:
Law schools have been flooding the nation with
graduates who are suffocating the economy with a
litigation epidemic of bubonic plague proportions.'
His successor as chair of the Council of Economic Advisors told the
National Economists Club that our legal system has become:
an albatross around productivity... we spend more
time and more resources actively suing each other or
taking defensive actions to prevent lawsuits that
could be generated toward or diverted toward pro-
ductive social uses.... And I think we badly need
to do that. I think part of the problem lies in the
nature of our civil justice system, and everything
from malpractice reform to product liability reform to
changing the basic nature of our civil justice system,
some of these economic incentives, that we get more
of a balance into our civil justice system to stop some
of the frivolous lawsuits."0
The thrust here is that lawyers impair America's economic
competitiveness and the principal means by which they do so is by
promoting bad litigation. "With 70% of the world's lawyers, it is
" Paul W. McCracken, The Big Domestic mwue: Slow Growth, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4,1991,
at A12.
" Michael Boakin, Remarks to the National Economists Club, Wuhington, D.C., FED.
NEWS SEVMICE, Mar. 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library.
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not surprising that America has experienced a litigation explo-
sion."71 In the words of Vice President Quayle:
[Tihe American people sense that something is
wrong with our legal system. They believe there are
too many lawsuits, ... too many excessive damage
awards. They believe there is too much litigation
and this is hurting the American economy. They
believe too much litigation is costing American jobs.
They believe that too much litigation is driving up
the cost of financing federal and state and local
government, that it's driving up the cost of liability
insurance and the key factor, is driving up health
care.
72
President Bush told the American Business Conference:
Over the last several years, dead weights have begun
to slow the engine of growth, inefficiencies a competi-
tive economy simply cannot tolerate. ... Let me
begin with the crying need to reform our country's
civil justice system. Every American has heard
stories of bizarre or frivolous lawsuits. But most of
you have lived with them, tales that could have been
torn from the pages of Kafka.73
Implicit in much of this talk is a folkloric image of plaintiffs'
lawyers working for contingency fees, seeking immense damages on
behalf of malingering or opportunistic clients, bringing frivolous
lawsuits based on "junk science" against deep pocket defendants,
and goading capricious juries to award excessive damages-
?1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Access to Justice Act of
1992 (Feb. 4, 1992).
" Vice President Quayle, Press Conference, supra note 53.
73 President George Bush, Remarks to the American Business Conference, Washington,
D.C., FED. NEWS SERVICE, April 7,1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW file
(hereinafter President Bush, April 7, 1992 Remarks].
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especially immense and arbitrary punitive damages.7' Litigation
explosion lore gives top billing to this figure of the "tassel-loafered"
lawyer.75 But complaints about the number and increase of
lawyers make no distinctions. All lawyers are inculpated for
promoting adversarialism, fostering complexity and uncertainty,
and sharing in the vast and undeserved profits generated by this
excessive litigation.76 This broader indictment is given clear
expression in a critique by Richard Weise, General Counsel of
Motorola: "America is awash with lawyers who make mischief....
They are forced to innovate, to develop new legal products so they
can usefully fill their time, that usually means thinking of ways to
separate American corporations from their money."77 He includes
not only securities class actions, but cases about wrongful termina-
4 
"[T]he civil justice reform in aimed at taking away the incentives that contingency fee
plaintiff lawyers have to bring cases based on junk science." L. Gordon Crovitz, Legal
Limits: Prescription for Change; Historical Roots, on McNeil-Lehrer News Hour (PBS
television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1992).
7 "[M]y opponent's campaign is being backed by practically every trial lawyer who ever
wore a tasseled loafer." George Bush, Acceptance Speech at the Republican National
Convention, in N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1992, at 9.
76 Crovitz, supra note 74. The centrality of the plaintiffs' lawyer as demon is preserved
by the theory that the bad sort of lawyers are the source of a spreading contamination of
professional life. Thus Walter Olson speaks of the way that "the influx of contingency-fee
lawyers into commercial and family litigation has begun to transform the style of practice
in those fields." WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASED THE LAWSUIT 232 (1991). Olson seems unaware that corporate litigators
need little instruction in hardball lawyering from "contingency-fee lawyers." For one of many
possible examples, we the account of Thomas Austern, whose scorched earth tactics delayed
insuance of an FDA order on the labelling of peanut butter for twelve years. MARK J.
GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT. THE UNSEEN POWER OF WASHINGTON LAWYERS, ch. 6(1975). Nor does Olson offer reliable guidance on the onset of such practices. He presents
an excerpt from one of the classic accounts of hardball lawyering, referring to events halfa
century ago, as if it were evidence of novel conditions. Cravath litigator Bruce Bromley told
Stanford law students in 1958:
I quickly realized in my early days at the bar that I could take the
simplest antitrust case ... and protract it for the defense almost to
infinity.
Bruce Bromley, Judicial Control of Antitrust Cases, 23 F.R.D. 417, 417 (1958). Olson
borrows an excerpt of the Bromley talk from a 1978 Time Magazine article, omitting the date
of Bromley's talk. OLSON, supra, at 231, 366.
7 Ronald E. Yates, Lawyers Not Exempt from Quality Crusade, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1991,
(Business), at 1 (quoting Richard Weise, General Counsel of Motorola). Weise also noted:
"Mne root of America's penchant for litigation can be found in the nation's prolific law
schools, which are admitting students and turning out lawyers at a rate well in excess of the
nation's ability to employ them." Id.
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tion and employee-benefit fraud. "The drain on corporate assets
and energy is tremendous.... While cases are being litigated,
corporate America often can't do anything innovative because
executives are too absorbed in and exhausted by the legal pro-
cess."
78
This portrays the lawyer as a parasite, feasting on productive
corporations. In its simple form, the "parasite" critique is that
lawyers do not "make" anything; but then neither do bankers,
insurers, accountants, diversified financial services companies,
police, pollution inspectors, etc. The spectacle of economists,
journalists, senators, and executives disparaging lawyers because
they do not make anything exposes a deep vein of anxiety about the
meaning of productivity in our information age. Beneath this
anxiety lies a genuine question: Do "services--particularly those
that are concerned with the regulation and facilitation of transac-
tions-contribute anything of value to society?
As the Weise quotation above indicates, it often is assumed that
the regulatory regime that envelops these corporations, manifested
in laws, administrative enforcement, litigation, and preventive
lawyering, imposes costs but engenders no benefits to society. The
estimates of costs that have figured prominently in the "too much
lawyering" discourse have been based on unsubstantiated conjec-
ture, have vacillated about just what is being measured, and have
conflated costs and transfers."
Beyond these infirmities, exclusive concentration on costs has
distracted the critics from looking at the benefits that might offset
or even surpass those costs. Our accounts should reflect not only
73Id.
7 ' Galanter, News from Nowhere, supra note 51. A significant portion of the wealth that
flows through the litigation system is justified compensation delivered to creditors and
wronged parties. The Institute for Civil Justice estimated that the net compensation to
plaintiffs in tort cases in 1985 was roughly half of the dollars spent on tort litigation. But
the portion received by plaintiffs varied with the type of litigation: it was 52% in automobile
torts, 43% in non-automobile torts, and only 37% in asbestos cases. DEBORAH . HENSIZE1
ET AL, TRENDS IN TORT LrIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATmTICS 29 (1987). I know
of no data about the ratio of recoveries to total expenditures in non-tort litigation. This half
(or more) of the supposed cost is a cost to defendants, but it is not a cost of the system or a
cost to the country, for the wealth is not lost, but only transferred to different hands.
Controlling these inordinate transaction costs is a worthy project that should not be
confounded with reducing the rights of claimants.
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the costs but also the benefits of enforcing such transfers, which
afford vindication, induce investments in safety, and deter undesir-
able behavior. For instance, the sums transferred by successful
patent infringement litigation not only are not lost, but maintain
the credibility of the patent system, which in turn has powerful
incentive effects. To put forward estimates of gross costs-even
ones that are not make-believe-as a guide to policy displays
indifference to the vital functions that the law performs. America's
institutions of remedy and accountability and the lawyers that staff
them are portrayed as burdensome afflictions. They are viewed as
costs and thus as deadweight losses.w
It is much more difficult to measure benefits than costs. But
several studies suggest that the presence of lawyers does confer
real benefits on their societies. Lawyers, concluded Robert Clark,
are specialists in normative ordering, and the increased demand for
their services is attributable to more intense and diverse interac-
tion, greater diversity, changes in wealth levels, and the burgeon-
ing of formal organizations."1 Stephen Bundy and Einer Elhauge
argue that lawyers' advice to clients results in an overall improve-
ment in the working of tribunals. 2 Frank Cross argues that, in
addition to promoting significant non-market benefits such as civil
liberties and political democracy, the presence of lawyers promotes
efficient allocation by helping to internalize externalities and by
facilitating transactions among dispersed, interdependent, produc-
a The costs attributable to present institutional arra1gements are made to loom
menacingly large by ignoring the costs of alternative arrangements for obtaining equivalent
benefits. For example, if we were to forego the tort system's contribution to accident
prevention, presumably people and businesses would make other expenditures to prevent
and minimize injury. The savings from completely abolishing the tort system would not be
all the billions that flow through it-nor even all the billions spent on it-but only that
increment beyond what would be spent on the alternative means of protection. Therefore,
a genuine assessment of the legal system would have to consider not only its costs, but both
the benefits it produces and the cost of producing such benefits by alternative means. See
Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 23 (1990); see also Peter L. Kahn, Pricing the U.S. Legal System, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 11, 1992, at 19.
81 Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad? 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
275 (1992).
' Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary




tive units." Ron Gilson argues that business lawyers create value
by acting as "transaction cost engineer[s].' In a pioneering field
study of business lawyering, Mark Suchman and Mia Cahill found
that:
Silicon Valley lawyers both absorb uncertainty and
increase the efficiency of venture capital financing by
promoting the elaboration of community norms.
Through their distinctive inter-organizational posi-
tion, lawyers help to create, transmit, sustain and
enforce the social structure of the Silicon Valley
venture capital market.",
A full assessment of the benefits, testing hypotheses about
linkages between what lawyers do and the occurrence of these
favorable things, must wait for another day. My point is that the
parasite argument is not closely dependent on evidence and that it
resonates with a deeper resentment of lawyers. Even if our system
of civil justice does produce benefits that outweigh its costs, critics
ask, why should lawyers be able to "farm" it for their personal
advantage? Here we turn to earlier polemicists who articulated
this theme.
C. THE JUSTICE TARIFF
Just 150 years ago, Georgian John W. Pitts published a little
book that both anticipates and illuminates current discontents."
Pitts thinks lawyers are driven by self-interest both to make laws
prolix and complicated and to "excite strife, confusion and de-
bate."87 Lawyer legislators make law complex and generate a
"Cross, First Thing, supra note 57.
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
" Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired-Gun as Conciliator. Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Dispute in Silicon Valley 17-18 (Nov. 20, 1993) (unpublished paper
presented to the University of Wisconsin Institute for Legal Studies Conference on Changing
Patterns of Business Lawyers).
" JoHN W. Pn'rs, ELEV NutBERs AGAc T LAWYER LEGisLATON AND FEES AT THE BAR
(n.p., 1843).
7Id. at 11, 13.
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need for lawyers to vindicate rights.' These rights are then
diminished, however, by the very need for professional lawyers,
who extract fees for securing these rights for their clients. The
justice they secure is thus flawed and incomplete, for a portion of
the clients' entitlement is diverted to the lawyers, who add no
value. Thus, for Pitts, every legal entitlement is diminished by the
presence of an occupational group that is paid for vindicating it.
This 'justice tariff' [my phrase, not his] is an affront to liberty,
which is "the power of enjoying rights without paying for them."
Fees at the bar, from their first institution up to this
hour, have been the source of more numerous and
more malignant evils in the countries where they
have been tolerated than all the wars, pestilences,
famines, tornadoes & earthquakes that ever ha-
rassed these lands.'
Beneath Pitts's bluster lie some of the deep roots of resentment of
lawyers, growing from the necessity of using and paying lawyers to
secure what people regard as already rightfully theirs.
Max Radin discerns an ancient theme that "justice is a man's
right. That is what society is for. It should be free as air." 1 In his
review of "Antilawyer Sentiment in the Early Republic," Maxwell
Bloomfield reports widespread suspicion of the lawyer as an
intruder who inserts himself into a self-regulating, harmonious
community, displacing substantive justice with artificial formality,
self-interest, and high fees.' As an influential anti-lawyer tract
of the early 19th century complains:
"Id. at 42. His argument that 'lawyer legislating is a major cause of bad policy
anticipates Magee's concern. For a discussion of Magee's research, see supra notes 56-69 and
accompanying text.
Prrrs, supra note 86, at 5.
5 Id. at 33.
'Radin, aupra note 1, at 748.




God never intended his creature man, should be
under the necessity to carry a written book in his
pocket, or a lawyer by his side, to tell him what is
just and lawful; he wrote it on his mind."
As one contemporary critic puts it, "There's a reason people hate
lawyers .... It's because they have a monopoly on what rightfully
belongs to everyone.' A long tradition holds that the need for
lawyer intermediaries is not natural, but is itself an outgrowth of
the lawyers' corruption of legal discourse. It is because lawyers
have made law complex and mysterious that they can levy the
justice tariff.
D. THE LAW TRAP: ENTANGLEMENT IN LEGAL MYTH
So the charge of economic predation has led us back to the sins
of discourse, for the justice tariff is supported by lawyers' successful
mystification of the law. In a famous polemic, Yale law professor
Fred Rodell decried the law as a pretense, a fraud, a hoax, mumbo-
jumbo, "a scheme of contradictory and nonsensical principles built
of inherently meaningless abstractions" that exercises a supersti-
tious hold over the populace." "The legal trade.., is nothing but
a high-class racket.' Lawyers are soothsayers, modern medicine
men, 7 "purveyors of streamlined voodoo," priests of mystifica-
tion.9
Rodell thinks that most business affairs "run off smoothly of their
own accord.' By introducing legalities, lawyers "no doubt
increase, instead of decreasing, the number of transactions that end
up in dispute and litigation."1" Yet lawyers can be narrowly
s JESSE HIGGMS, SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES 92 (2d ed. 1805), quoted in
BLOOMFIELD, supra note 92, at 48.
" Castelmen, supra note 8, at 182,184 (quoting Jake Warner, one of the founders of Nolo
Press, a leading publisher of do-it-yourself legal material).
FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYEMI 166 (2d ed. 1957).
"Id. at 16.
This characterization was particularly appealing to Rodell's most recent admirer:
Rennard Strickland, The Lawyer as Modern Medicine Man, 11S. ILL. U. LJ. 208,208 (1986).





useful. The law tends to favor the rich and powerful because its
fraudulent character can be manipulated by lawyers:
It makes it worth-while for those with money enough
to afford it to buy the court services and the pre-
court advice of those mumbo-jumbo chanters and
scribblers who can best wring desired results out of
legal language and legal principles. 0 1
Rodell vacillates on the culpability of lawyers for this state of
affairs. At times he portrays them as self-deceived: "[The lawyers,
taken as a whole, cannot by any means be accused of deliberately
hoodwinking the public.... They, too, are blissfully unaware that
the sounds they make are essentially empty of meaning."10 2 Yet
elsewhere they are portrayed as knowing conspirators:
For the lawyers know it would be woe unto the
lawyers if the non-lawyers ever got wise to the fact
that their lives were run, not by The Law, not by any
rigid and impersonal and automatically applied code
of rules, but instead by a comparatively small group
of men, smart, smooth, and smug-the lawyers."
Rodell has his technocratic version of that abiding faith in a
simple, natural, accessible system of social regulation. He would
abolish law and replace it with a practical, comprehensible system
of common-sense decisionmaking by experts.'" Where critics like
1
-Id. at 164.
Id. at 131. But see id. at 16 (accusing lawyers of being part of a "racket").
Id. at 108.
Robells' prescriptions for change are found in Chapter XI. The following passages give
a sample of their flavor.
The answer is to get rid of the lawyers and.., run our civilization
according to practical and comprehensible rules, dedicated to non-legal
justice, to common-or-garden fairness that the ordinary man can
understand, in the regulation of human affairs.
A mining engineer could handle a dispute centering around the value
of a coal-mine much more intelligently and therefore more fairly than
any judge, untrained in engineering, can handle it. A doctor could
handle a dispute involving a physical injury much more intelligently and
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President Carter portrayed lawyers as errant priests of the true
church of social justice, Rodell portrays them as the idolatrous
priests of a false religion, which he thinks can be dismantled by
eliminating lawyers.
This dark vision of law as fraudulent mystification runs from
Pitts to Rodell to contemporary anti-lawyer polemicists, 1°  and
reappears as a component of the new "economic" anti-lawyerism
that dominates current discourse about lawyers. Rodell's portrayal
of lawyers as the source of the mythic reification of legal rules and
as captives of the law's empty mysteries makes important empirical
claims about the beliefs and behavior of lawyers and lay people,
claims that I suspect are at least incomplete and very likely
seriously mistaken. Forty years ago, David Riesman observed that
lawyers
are feared and disliked-but needed-because of
their matter-of-factness, their sense of relevance,
their refusal to be impressed by magical "solutions"
to people's problems. Conceivably, if this hypothesis
therefore more fairly than any judge....
"'s a matter of fact, abolition of the lawyers and their Law might
eventually lead to the virtual disappearance of courts as we know them
today. Every written law-written, you remember, in comprehensible
language-might be entrusted to a body of technical experts, to adminis-
ter and apply it and make specific decisions under it.... [E]ach state
would have, say, a Killing Commission to apply its laws about what are
now called murder and manslaughter. Moreover, the decision of the
technical experts who make up each commission would be final. There
would be no appeals ....
Id. at 167, 169-70, 176.
iN For example, the contemporary Texas anti-lawyer polemicist Alfred Adask states:
Our entire judicial system has become an extortion racket designed to
enrich lawyers at the expense of productive members of society. Almost
every licensed, practicing lawyer is a beneficiary and co-conspirator in
that extortion racket....
Lawyers are *political racketeers," 'economic cannibals,* and "social parasites' who "help..
destroy America for a buck.* Lawyers are:
98% bad people, lousy Americans, ethical cowards, professional socio-
paths who are almost certainly the primary cause of the social and
economic decline of this nation.




is right, the ceremonial and mystification of the legal
profession are, to a considerable degree, veils or
protections underneath which this rational, all too
rational, work of the lawyer gets done.1"
Jethro Lieberman suggests that lawyers are not votaries of illusory
certainty, but rather technicians of indeterminacy:
The only secret that the lawyer really possesses
about the law is that no one can ever be certain of
what the law is.... The lawyer is accustomed to the
ways of bending and changing rules to suit his (or
his client's) purposes, to dance in the shadows of the
law's ambiguities. Rules hold no particular terror for
the lawyer, just as the sight of blood holds no terror
for the surgeon. Because he operates a system of
rules, the lawyer becomes indifferent to them in the
way that a doctor becomes indifferent to the humani-
ty of the body that is lying on the operating
table.10
7
These observations raise the question whether it is lawyers' bloody-
mindedness that irks people rather than, or along with, their
penchant for mystification. Answering that question requires close
analysis of professional and popular perceptions of the law, how
these views shape and are shaped by lawyer-client interaction,s
',David Riesman, Toward an Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Profession,
in INDI IuA sM RECoNsIDERED AND OTHER ESSAYS 450 (1954). Compare Sally Engel
Merry's observation in a contemporary urban court:
If a case progresses to a pretrial conference or to a trial, the prosecutors
and defense attorneys play a critical role in translating complex,
emotional problems into narrow legal cases. They serve as the front line,
cleansing problems of their emotionally chaotic elements and reducing
them to cold rational issues.
SALLY ENGEL MERRY, GETING JUSTICE AND GETING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG
WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 148 (1990) [hereinafter MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE].
107 LIEBERMAN, supra note 32, at 208-09.
1 In at least some settings, lawyers spend considerable effort reducing their clients'
sense of the determinacy and predictability of the law. For a contemporary example, see
Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law And Strategy In The Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20
LAW & SocdY REV. 93 (1986).
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how this varies from setting to setting, and how it has changed
over time. Whether the public perceives lawyers as genuine or
bogus votaries of the law's mysteries and the extent to which it
subscribes to those mysteries is deeply problematic."
IV. THE DISTRIBUTION OF VIEWS ABOUT LAWYERS
The new economic anti-lawyerism is closely connected to what I
have called the "jaundiced view" of our civil justice system ex-
pressed by political, media, and business elites. How does this
strain of anti-lawyer feeling relate to the array of attitudes toward
lawyers in American society? Unfortunately, we do not have a
comprehensive profile of the attitudes and beliefs of the public
regarding lawyers; nor do we know how these views have changed
over time. A scatter of public opinion data, however, enables us to
get a sense of the general contours and some inkling of recent
trends.110
1 For example, most Americans believe that &[t]he legal system favors the rich and
powerful over everyone else" and that ]awyers will (not) work as hard for poor clients as
for clients who are rich and important.3 BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 234 (1977). Sally Merry observes that
her working class American court-users
do not accept that the system is always fair, just, or even-handed.
Experience in court leads them to think that the institution is erratic,
unreliable, and sometimes ineffectual. For many, a sense of legal
entitlement coexists with cynicism about power and influence within the
government and the court system.
MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE, supra note 106, at 170. A comparable skepticism is displayed in
surveys from Canada, where most respondents think of lawyers as manipulators who "are
always finding loopholes to get around the law,' Robert J. Moore, Reflections of Canadians
on the Law and the Leal System: Legal Research Institute Survey of Respondents in
Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg, in LAW IN A CYNICAL SOCIETY? OPINION AND TE LAW IN
THE 19808 41, 53 (Dale Gibson & Janet K. Baldwin eds., 1985), and in England, where
respondents think lawyers "[flor a price ... will use every trick in the book to help their
clients,* BRIAN ABEL-SMITH IT AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS AND THE CITIZEN 249-50 (1973).
11 Much of the survey data reported in this section is derived from three national sample
surveys, each conducted by telephone. Two of these surveys were conducted for the National
Law Journal, the first in 1986 and the second in 1993. The third major survey was
conducted for the American Bar Association in 1993.
The first of the NationalLaw Journal surveys (n=1004) was published in David A. Kaplan,
The NLJ Poll Results: Take Heed, Lawyers, NAT LJ., Aug. 18,1986, at S-2 [hereinafter
Kaplan, NLJ Poll]. A second survey (n=815), which largely replicates the 1986 survey and
thus provides a useful reading of recent changes, was conducted for the National Law
Journal and the West Publishing Company by Penn & Schoen Associates, Inc. This survey
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Most Americans who have used lawyers think well of them. In
a 1986 National Law Journal (NLJ) poll, almost half of American
adults reported professional contact with a lawyer within the
preceding five years."1 Well over half of these users reported
themselves "very satisfied7 with the lawyer's performance and
another quarter were "somewhat satisfied."" By 1993, the
number who had used a lawyer had risen to 68%."' In compari-
son, 67% of the respondents in the 1993 ABA survey reported using
a lawyer in the last ten years.1 14  Even with all these novice
customers, the level of dissatisfaction was only slightly higher.1
About two-thirds of the ABA respondents who used lawyers were
satisfied.116
But when asked about lawyers in the aggregate, the public views
them less favorably. Lawyers' ethical standards and practices are
thought to be middling by most people, with a much larger
contingent regarding them as poor (21%) than as excellent
(3%).117 Those who thought lawyers less honest than most people
rose from 17% in 1986 to 31% in 1993.8 The ABA poll reports
that "W[h]alf the public thinks that about one-third or more of
lawyers are dishonest, including one in four Americans who believe
that a majority of lawyers are dishonest."19 Over the past
decade, general estimations of lawyers have fallen. In the 1993
was published in Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NATL L. J., Aug. 9,1993, at
1 [hereinafter Samborn, Anti-Lawyer].
The other 1993 survey (n-1202) was conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc.,
for the American Bar Association. It was reported in Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The
Public Perception ofLawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60 [hereinafter Hengstler,
Vox Populi]. More extensive data can be found in PETR D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES,
A SURVEY OF AT7=IUDES NATIONWIDE TOWARD LAWYERs AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (Jan. 1993)
[hereinafter HART SURVEY].
n Kaplan, NLJ Poll, supra note 110, at Table 4.
"'Id. at Table 6.
1U Samborn, Anti.Lawyer, supra note 110, at Graphs 4-5.
114 HART SURVEY, aupra note 110, at 25.
" Samborn, Anti-Lawyer, supra note 110 (containing a steady number of "very satisfied'
responses).
" HART SURVEY, eupra note 110, at 25.
17 ABC New/WaShington Post Survey, May 1989 (on file with author).
"s Samborn, Anti-Lawyer, supra note 110, at 20. Samborn reviews figures from Gallup
and Roper polls that suggest a downward trend in estimations of the ethical character of
lawyers since the mid-1970s. Id.
19 HAr SURVEY, supra note 110, at 5.
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NLJ survey, 36% of the respondents said their image of lawyers
had "gotten worsen and only 8% said it had "improved."' °
Disapproval of lawyers is not distributed uniformly, and there is
a pronounced pattern to the disparities:
By and large, those who see lawyers in a more
favorable light than average tend to be downscale,
women, minorities, and young....
... Americans who are more critical than average
tend to be more establishment, upscale, and male.
The higher the family income and socioeconomic
status, the more critical the adults are. Pluralities
of college graduates feel unfavorably toward lawyers,
while pluralities of non-college graduates feel favor-
ably.12'
More and more Americans believe that there are too many
lawyers. In 1986, 55% of the NLJ respondents believed that there
were too many lawyers; in 1993 this number had increased to
73%.' The ABA survey asked people to volunteer criticism of
lawyers: only five percent volunteered that they were too numer-
ous.' This sense of the superfluity of lawyers is more intense
among "top" people.' While 55% of all respondents to the 1986
NLJ survey agreed that the country had too many lawyers, this
sentiment was shared by 69% of college graduates, 68% of those
earning over $50,000 annually, and 64% of the occupational
Samborn, Anti-Lawyer, supra note 110, at 1.
"
1 HART SURVEY, supra note 110, at 4-5.
'Samborn, Anti.Lawwr, supra note 110, at 1.
m HART SURVEY, supra note 110, at 18.
m This pattern is not unique to present day America. In early modem England,
antagonism to lawyers and blaming them for excessive litigation was highest among top
people. C.W. BROOKS, PETTrOGGERS AND VIPMRS OF THE COMMONWEALTH: THE LOWER
BRANCH' OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 136 (1986); WILFRED .




category made up of professionals, executives, and managers.125
A 57% majority thought lawyers had "too much influence and
power in society."' Again, distribution was skewed with more
prosperous and powerful groups high (college graduates, 64%,
professionals, 60%) and outsider groups low (blacks, 39%). 27
"Top" groups were also the most likely to attribute to lawyers
principal responsibility for a litigation explosion in the United
States.' Curiously, however, the members of these categories
were at least as highly satisfied with the performance of their own
lawyers as were respondents overall."2
This profile of elite concern is reflected in a 1992 survey of
executives by Business Week, which found that 62% felt "that the
U.S. civil justice system significantly hampers the ability of U.S.
companies to compete with Japanese and European compan-
ies.""3  Over 80% believed that the fear of lawsuits was grow-
ing.131 Elites, including lawyers, seem to hold exaggerated views
of the prevalence of litigation, the size of awards, and the incidence
of punitive damages.1 12 More generally, perceptions of the men-
ace of product liability litigation have intensified during a period in
which many indicators suggest that the world of product liability
is contracting rather than expanding." Folklore about the
1w Kaplan, NJ Poll, supra note 110, at Table 9.
Sambom, Anti-Lawyer, supra note 110, at Question 4.
' Id. at Question 22.
' Id. at Table 6. They were among the most knowledgeable, least enthusiastic about
mandatory pro bono service for lawyers, and most opposed to an elective federal judiciary.
Id.
'" Mark N. Vamo, The Verdict from the Corner Office, BuS. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 66.
This was a survey conducted by Louis Harris & Associates, in early 1992, of 400 senior
executives drawn from the "Business Week Top 1000* companies. Id.
131 Id.
A survey of how the working of tort law was perceived by three elite groups in South
Carolina (doctors, lawyers, and legislators) found that all of them overestimated the
incidence of litigation, the percentage of cases that went to jury trial, the proportion of jury
trials that were won by plaintiffs, and the size ofjudicial awards. Donald R. Songer, Tort
Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite Perceptions Concerning
Jury Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REV. 585 (1988).
1 Fewer non-asbestos product liability cases are filed, plaintiffs have been less successful
at trial, defendants have secured favorable opinions from the courts in an increasing number
of cases, the number of punitive damage awards in product liability cases has decreased, and
claims per dollar of product liability premium have fallen. See generally Galanter, News
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spectre of runaway litigation abounds, augmented and amplified by
a small but vigorous industry.13'
But the broad public subscribes to much of the jaundiced view.
Over half thought it a fair criticism of most lawyers that "[t]hey file
too many lawsuits and tie up the court system."1' 3 And when
asked whether it was a fair criticism that lawyers' "excessive costs
and lawsuits make America less able to compete against foreign
countries," only 31% thought it was an unfair criticism--although
another 28% thought it should be confined to a minority of
lawyers." A resounding 74% agreed that "the amount of
litigation in America today is hampering this country's economic
recovery."1 7  But only 25% thought lawyers "played the largest
role" in contributing to the liability crisis, trailing insurers
(34%).'a3 (In spite of falling estimations of lawyers, the public
attribution of the litigation explosion and the liability crisis to
lawyers declined slightly from 1986 to 1993, while rising slightly
for insurers and manufacturers.) Traces of the public justice
critique surface in these broad public soundings: "The public
contends that lawyers have suffered the greatest decline in the
areas of defending the underdog, providing leadership in the
community, and seeking justice."13 9
It appears that the jaundiced view, which sees lawyers as
fostering a civil justice system that is devouring American business,
is more intense and more widespread among elites-i.e., among
those with more wealth, education, and power. For all their
misgivings about lawyers, other survey evidence suggests that most
Americans (also) hold very different views of the legal system.
from Nowhere, supra note 51.
1 In addition to eager consumers of folklore about litigation and lawyers, there are eager
suppliers who have an interest in promoting lore about the litigation menace. See, eg.,
Daniels, supra note 47 (discussing insurance industry civil-justice campaign); Lauren B.
Edelman et al., Profeuional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Dischwrge,
26 LAW & SOY REV. 47 (1992) (finding exaggerated pessimistic lore about the dangers to
corporations of employment discrimination suits promoted by personnel and legal
professionals); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1637,1705-22 (1992-93) (Manhattan Institute promotion of civil justice lore).
I HART SURVEY, supra note 110, at 16.
us Id.
Samborn, Anti-Lawyer, supra note 110, at Question 23.
Id. at Question 22.
HART SURVEY, supra note 110, at 18.
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Although they do not express a high degree of confidence in the
legal system, their qualms do not seem to involve the system's
oppression of business. When asked whether "[the justice system
in the United States mainly favors the rich" or "treats all Ameri-
cans as equally as possible," 57% of respondents chose the "favored
the rich" response and only 39% the "equally" response.14 Simi-
larly, 59% of a national sample agreed that "the legal system favors
the rich and powerful over everyone else.""' When asked which
types of people were "not apt to be treated fairly by the law,"
respondents identified the poor (54%), uneducated (47%), and
blacks (33%); only 5% thought "top business executives" were
treated unfairly.1 42 Indeed, when asked which types of persons
"the courts are too lenient with," government officials and top
business executives ranked, along with heroin users and frequent
offenders, just below dope peddlers.'
The grievances of ordinary people are quite different from those
that constitute the jaundiced view. An examination of the publica-
tions of HALT, a reform organization founded in 1977, indicates the
kind of issues that engage that small section of the public that
devotes attention and energy to challenging lawyers' practices.'
They are concerned about excessive fees, particularly exactions like
fixed percentage probate fees. They are concerned with the
weakness of lawyer discipline and call for the abolition of self-
regulation and the establishment of an open public procedure for
grievances against lawyers. They want plain language, do-it-
yourself provisions, and higher small claims court limits-all to
permit citizens to pursue their legal business without lawyers; they
14 ABC News/Washington Poet Survey, June 1985 (USACWP.196.R24) (on file with
author).14 1 CURRAN, supra note 109, at 234.
142 Roper Report S7-7, July, 1987 (on file with author).
148 Id.
14 HALT was founded in 1977. The name was originally an acronym for "Help Abolish
Legal Tyranny,* but this was displaced by the less combative 'An Organization of Americans
for Legal Reform.' In early 1988, it was reported that the organization had a staff of 26 and
nearly 150,000 "nembers.' Help from HALT, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,1988, at BS. Since then,
economic constraints have led to closing the field offices and cutting the staff to about a
dozen; in 1992, membership was said to be about 100,000. Martha Middleton, HALT: Rebels
at a Crossroad, STUDZNT LAW., Sept. 1992, at 21, 22. Grassroots and militant offshoots such
as Justice for All and the National Congress for Legal Reform charged HALT with being
unresponsive to its membership and too amicable with the bar. Id.
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oppose the lawyer monopoly, enthusiastically urging nonlawyer
practice. It is a consumerist perspective in which access is a major
theme: they want a system that is user-friendly for ordinary
people. Overall, problems are visualized as impositions on
individual users rather than in the aggregate perspective that is
part of the jaundiced view.
The gulf between the jaundiced view and this more consumerist
take on lawyers is revealed by the response of HALT leadership to
Dan Quayle's campaign against the civil justice system. HALT
officials welcomed Quayle's ABA speech as a boost "for the visibility
of the legal reform movement" and for putting reform on the front
burner, but criticized the Quayle proposals as "either too superficial
or too one-sided."1' Invoking the access theme, the organiza-
tion's Executive Director took a cool view of the Council on
Competitiveness reforms, which "tend to be aimed at reducing
litigation for the sake of reducing litigation, without addressing the
impact these proposals will have on obtaining justice."14 A few
months later, comparing the reform proposals of the ABA and the
Bush administration, HALT's Deputy Director criticized the ABA
proposal as "too lawyer-dominated-it equates access to justice with
finding an attorney-and fails to take into account the consumer
perspective."147 The administration's legislation, on the other
hand, "is too one sided and is aimed more at reducing litigation
than ensuring justice."1 48 There is no indication here of any
objection to the substantive justice afforded by the system-what
is wanted is expanded access to it. If the HALT view is at all
reflective of what ordinary people want, then we can understand
how the anti-lawyer strategy of the 1992 Bush campaign mistaken-
ly conflated distinct kinds of anti-lawyer sentiment. Attacks on the
litigation explosion, which caught fire with elite audiences, were
expected to ignite the grievances and resentments of the wider
public.14 But the wider public's concern about the legal system
' On the Front Burner, THE LEGAL REFORMER 12(1)1 (Oct.-Dec. 1991).1 1d.
147 White House, ABA Offer Tort Reforms, THE LEGAL REFORMER 12(3)6 (Apr.-Jun, 1992).
144 Id.
I See Karen Riley, Measure To Limit Product Lawsuit Shelved in Senate for this
Session, WAsH. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1992, at C3 (stating President Bush's *attacks on the
litigation system and on trial lawyers have consistently drawn some of the loudest cheers
668 [Vol. 28:633
PREDATORS AND PARASITES
includes the theme of access to the remedies and protections of the
legal system.
To business people, who feel accused of responsibility for
America's flagging economic performance and lack of competitive-
ness, it is reassuring to know that the fault is not theirs and that
they are the victims of predatory lawyers, activist judges, and
biased jurors." But the evidence that the liability system
actually impairs the economic competitiveness of American
corporations is vanishingly thin.151 The focus on lawyers and civil
liability as a major source of business distress does not seem to be
the product of calculating examination of balance sheets. Instead
it seems to proceed from, or at least implicate, the resentments of
lawyers discussed earlier.
V. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
A. ONLY IN AMERICA?
In the jaundiced view, America's legal malaise is not an ex-
pression of its essential character, but is part of a falling away from
the true America. The jaundiced view mourns the loss of a time
when society was benignly self-regulating, law was clear, certain
and reasonable, judges applied it dutifully and eschewed activism,
lawyers were upright paragons of civic virtue, and litigation was
in his recent campaign stops").
' Business and other elites are not exempt from the current cultural style of finding
solace and justification by displaying oneself as a victim. Popular strains of victimism are
widely deplored. See, eg., CHARLEs J. SYKES, A NATION OF VICTIMS: THE DECAY OF
AMERICAN CHARACTER (1992); John Taylor, Don't Blame Me: The New Culture of
Victimization, NEW YOM, June 3,1991, at 26; Jesse Birnbaum, Crybabies: Eternal Victims,
TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 16 (asserting that this is the 'age of the victim"). Higher status
varieties are less celebrated. Sally Power, They Did It!, Bus. ETHICS, SeptJOct. 1993, at 22
("[0]ne might argue business itself has come to see itself as a victim, blaming the courts, the
media, and the legal system for placing companies at risk.").
" This evidence is assessed in Galanter, News from Nowhere, supra note 51, at 90-99.
The supposed bias ofjurors against corporations is examined in Valerie P. Hans & William
S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the
Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & SOCY REV. 85 (1992).
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rare.152 Nostalgia for this normal, orderly world flourishes in
many sectors of American life.1" Within the legal profession
itself, many share the sense that law has declined from a noble
profession infused with civic virtue to commercialism. 1'  This
sense of decline has been a recurrent theme for at least a hundred
years. Distress about lost virtue has been a constant accompani-
ment of elite law practice since the formation of the large firm a
hundred years ago." The time when virtue prevailed is just over
the receding horizon of personal experience. Lawyers' sense of
decline reflects the gap between practice and professional ideology:
in the flesh, working life is experienced as more mundane, routine,
business-like, commercial, money-driven, client-dominated, and
'
m In the most elaborated version of the jaundiced view, OLSON, supra note 76, there is
recurrent reference to "the old legal system--a normal orderly world in which the law was
clear, judges were restrained, lawyers were upright, and litigation was rare. Id. at 3;.we also
id. at 142, 145, 155-56, 168, 216-19, 340. See also PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). Huber's book is premised on the notion that
"we are living in an altogether new legal environment, created in little more than twenty
years, and profoundly different from what existed in this country and in England for six
centuries before." Id. at 10. Huber makes references to the more rational and benign
conditions that prevailed under 'the old law." Eg., id at 21, 23, 71, 96, 97, 116-19, 186.
' See, e.g., David Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders and Personal Iqjuries
in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOCY REv. 551,551-52 (1984). Engel studied a small
Illinois county in which concern about litigiousness was high, although there was relatively
little litigation. Id. at 551. Although contract actions were almost ten times as frequent as
personal injury cases, it was the latter that provoked concern because they controverted core
community values of self-sufficiency and stoic endurance. Id. at 574-75. Engel concluded
that denunciation of tort litigation was "significant mainly as a symbolic effort by members
of the traditional community to preserve a sense of meaning and coherence in the face of
social changes they found threatening and confusing." Id. at 580.
15 The latest entry is SOL M. LINowrrz WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994). But the
literature is vast. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams, The Legal Profession: A Critical Evaluation,
93 DICK. L REV. 643, 652 (1989) ("T]he... most pervasive manifestation of the chance in
the legal climate is the decline ofprofessionalism and its replacement with commercialism.*);
Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REv. 741 (1988);
Lincoln Caplan, The Lawyers' Race to the Bottom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at A-29. A
dyspeptic version of the declension theme is PETER MEGARGEE BROWN, RASCALS: THE
SELLING OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1989). A recent scholarly and theoretical account of
professional decline is ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAwYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). The bar's "official" account of the danger of commercialization is
the STANLEY REPORT, supra note 40.
I" MARC GAIANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 11, 36 (1991); Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 1 (1988).
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conflict-laden than it is supposed to be. It is easy to believe that
the way it is supposed to be is the way that it used to be."
This nostalgia is fused to a sense that America has taken a
wrong turn. The contemporary critique of lawyers as economic
predators is pervaded by a sense of the uniqueness of the American
predicament. Vice President Quayle's "seventy percent" probed a
sensitive spot precisely because it served as shorthand for the sense
that we are radically different and have departed the trodden path
along a perilous detour. While other industrial democracies
flourished with few lawyers and less litigation, we carried a
crushing legal burden. Japan was Exhibit A, displaying the inverse
relation of lawyers to economic vigor.157 As fortunes change and
the United States is again regarded as outperforming its economic
rivals,"' it remains to be seen how many of those who were so
outspoken about the deleterious effect of lawyers will retain their
conviction of the close linkage of legal activity to economic perfor-
mance.
A media pundit tells us, "It's an 'only in America' spectacle that
we have here where products that are later proven to be perfectly
safe are driven off the market by lawyers."1 O President Bush,
lamenting the debilitating effects of litigation against corporations,
stresses that "[o]nly the United States has seen the number of
' Lawyers are not the only legal actors beguiled by nostalgic reconstruction of the past.
See Marc Galanter, The ife and Tmes of the Big Six: Or, The Federal Courts Since the
Good Old Days, 1988 WiS. L. REV. 921 (misperception by Supreme Court Justice of change
in Federal Court Dockets.).
"' The relative abence of lawyers in Japan is noted with commendation by many
observers. See, eg., Warren Burger, Agenda for 2000 AD.-A Need for Systematic
Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 94 (1976); Laurence H. Silberman, Will Lawyering Strangle
Democratic Capitalism?, RZGUIATION, Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 15, 21 (-[Plerhaps some measure
of the competitive advantage that Japan and some European nations seem to enjoy vis-a-vis
the United States is attributable to their much les intrusive use of lawyers.*); William
Chapman, Japan: the Land of Few Lawyers, WASH. Pon, Apr. 19, 1981, at C5 (noting
comparatively few lawyers in Japan); Laurence H. Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice:
An Argument for Delegalizing America, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, July 1979, at 25 (noting that
the United States has twenty times more lawyers per capita than Japan); Steve Lohr, Tokyo
Air Crush: Why Japanese Do Not Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1982, at 1 (discussing Japan's
lack of litigiousness).
' Xg., Sylvia Nasar, The American Economy: Back on Top, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994,
13, at 1 (noting America's economic prosperity).
' Crovitz, supra note 74.
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lawyers double over a 20 year period."" °  Actually, lawyer
populations have been growing even faster elsewhere. Between the
years 1965 and 1985, the number of lawyers in the United States
roughly doubled. But the rate of growth of the legal profession was
higher in Canada, England, France, and Germany, to take only a
few places for which data is readily available.1"' In other re-
spects as well, other industrial democracies seem less different
from the United States. All have taken part in a tremendous
enlargement of the legal world: the amount and complexity of
regulation; the frequency of litigation; the amount of authoritative
legal material; the number, coordination, and productivity of
lawyers; the number of legal actors and the resources they devote
to legal activity; the amount of information about law and the
velocity with which it circulates-all of these have multiplied
several times over. 6 2
Comparisons with supposedly less legalistic and contentious
populations elsewhere do not invariably show Americans to be more
litigious and legalistic." Several recent and detailed compari-
lu President Bush, April 7, 1992, Remarks, supra note 73.
1 1 Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions, in 3 LAYER IN SOCIETY,
at Table 3.2 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988).
" Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisation Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L.
REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Galanter, Law Abounding].
' British respondents are more likely to seek legal assistance in connection with work
accidents than are Americans. DEBORAH R. HzNSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNrED STATES 129 (1991) (suggesting disparity might reflect
fact that, in Great Britain, injured workers can sue employers, while in the United States
they may not). Auto accident victims in Ontario were found "slightly more likely to seek
professional legal help in dealing with compensation-related issues than are victims in the
United States.' Herbert Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injury: Compensation Seeking in
Canada and the United States 37 (Working Paper 10-4, Institute for Legal Studies, Disputes
Processing Research Program, University of Wisconsin-Madison). A comparison of
Australian and American disputing found Australians to be "substantially more likely to
complain of troubles than are their U.S. counterparts and somewhat more likely to engage
in an actual dispute,* but fewer of these disputes reached the courts. Jeffrey FitzGerald,
Grievances, Disputes & Outcomes: A Comparison of Australia and the United States, in 1
LAW IN CONTEXT 15, 30 (1983).
Explanations for the observed differences range from incentives that derive from
substantive or procedural rules to the general character of the compensation system to the
wider culture with its views of adversity, misfortune, assertion, recompense, and so forth.
Patrick Atiyah attributes the greater incidence of tort cases in the United States to more
favorable law, higher awards, lower risks, and fewer alternatives to litigation. P.S. Atiyah,
Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo.American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L. J. 1002,
672
1994] PREDATORS AND PARASITES 673
sons place more emphasis on the similarities that interlace the
differences in litigation patterns. A study comparing tort litigation
in the United States, Britain, and Germany concludes with the
surmise that "the differences that exist between the systems are
much less spectacular than they are commonly believed to be once
allowance has been made for differences in cost of medical care,
standard of living and the cost and method of funding litiga-
tion." " A study of medical malpractice claims in the United
States, Canada, and England takes up the "similar growth in
malpractice litigation during the 1970s and 1980s" and takes this
"parallelism [to] suggest.., that this growth must arise less from
isolated doctrinal changes in one country than from changes in
medical practice and social mores, which occur roughly simulta-
neously in most Western countries."1 6 These convergences are
more remarkable because the other countries place far less reliance
on courts and litigation to deal with compensation for injury than
is the case in the United States."
1016-25. The focus on incentives is shared by Robert Pritchard, who emphasizes the primacy
of rules about costs and fees. Robert S. Pritchard, A Systematic Approach to Comparative
Law: The Effect of Coat, Fee and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive
Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 451, 456-60 (1988). Herbert Kritzer argues that "the kinds of
incentive-based factors advanced by Atiyah and Pritchard cannot explain more than a small
part of the blaming and claiming gaps" and emphasizes the expectations that frame the legal
activity, leaving open the question of how much these "arise from the compensation systems
themselves and... [how much they are] much more deeply ingrained in the semiotic spiral
that definets] different cultures?" Herbert Kritzer, The Propensity to Sue in England and
the United States: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases 36 (1991) (Working Paper DPRP
10-5, Institute for Legal Studies, Disputes Processing Research Program, University of
Wisconsin-Madison). To Robert Kagan, who contrasts English legal culture that sees law as
an authoritative ideal with American legal culture that takes a more instrumental and
political view of law, these views reflect the organization of social and political life in the two
countries. Robert A. Kagan, What Makes Uncle Sammy Sue? 21 LAW & SOC Y REV. 717
(1988).
1 Basil Markesinis, Litigation-Mania in England, Germany and the USA. Are We So
Very Different?, 49 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 238, 273-74 (1990).
1
" Donald N. Dewees et al., The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A Comparative Empirical
Perspective 54 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 217, 250 (Winter & Spring 1991).
I" See WERNER PFENNGBTORF & DONALD G. GnoRD, A ComPAATIV STUDY OF
LIABILITY LAwAND COMPENSATION ScHmEs i TEN COuNTRiE AND THE UNITED STATES 129
(Donald G. Gifford & William M. Richman eds. 1991) (noting less frequent resort to tort
system in other industrialized democracies is due to presence of public entitlement systems
or to public and private insurance). The authors point out that these "alternative
compensation sources do much of the work that is accomplished under the tort system in the
United States. Id. On the scantier coverage and lesser coordination of American social
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Swift and incessant currents of American influence are flowing
through the legal systems of the industrialized world and spilling
over into ex-second and third worlds. As one European observer
sums it up, "almost all fundamental and far-reaching changes in
European law and understanding of law during the post-war period
have started from America. 1 67 American styles of structuring
business relations, drafting contracts, regulating financial markets,
and protecting injury victims have infiltrated into European legal
practice.' There is massive borrowing of American institutional
devices from constitutionalism and judicial review"M to the large
business law firm," alternative dispute resolution,1 7 1 and pub-
lic interest law. 72 The lopsided infusion of procedural and
substantive law, of general concepts and perspectives, of new
security schemes, see P.R. KAIM-CAUDLE, COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL
SECURrr: A TEN-CoUNTY PERSPCTnvE (1973); John M. Grana, Disability Allowances for
Long-Term Care in Western Europe and the United States 36 imL Soc. SECURIY REv. 207
(1983). Cf. ALID KAHN, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL
SERVICEs IN INTERNATIONAL PERsPEonVE tbl. 2.2 (1976).
1
- Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229,
232 (1991).
1Id. at 235-42.
' See, eg., JUDICIAL ACTm IN COMPARATiVE PRSPECVE (Kenneth M. Holland ed.,
1991); ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE (1992); Guido Calebresi,
Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 N.W. U. L. REV. 269 (1993); Mauro Cappelletti, Repudiating
Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of 'Constitutional Justice," 85 CATH. U. L. REV.
1 (1985); Mary L. Volcansek, Politics, Courts and Judges in Western Europe, (unpublished
paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association).
1 See, e.g., Yves Dezalay, Territorial Battles and Tribal Disputes, 54 MOD. L. REV. 792
(1991); Yves Dezalay, The Big Bang and the Law: The Internationalization and Restructur-
ation of the Legal Field, 7 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'Y 279 (1990); John Flood, Megalaw in
the U.K: Professionalism or Corporatism? A Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L. J. 569 (1988-
1989); R. G. Lee, From Profession to Business: The Rise and Rise of the City Law Firm, 19
J. L. & SoC'Y 31 (1992).
While the large business law firm is the most prominent organizational borrowing, there
is also some borrowing of devices such as the formation of litigation groups by plaintiffs'
lawyers in mass disaster cases. See STUART M. SPEISER, LAWYERS AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM 344-64 (1993) (discussing formation of litigation groups in United Kingdom).
"I See, e.g., BEYOND DISPUTING: EXPLORING LEGAL CULTURES IN FiZ EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES (Konstanxe Plett & Catherine Mewhievitz eds., 1991); THOMAS E. CAMIMONNEAU,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOITION (1989); Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Reolution
Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access.to-Justice Movement, 56 MOD. L.
REV. 282 (1993); Simon Roberts, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Civil Justice: An
Unresolved Relationship, 56 MOD. L. REV. 452 (1993).




images of lawyering, and of new organizational forms has provoked
European observers to compare the contemporary wave of Ameri-
canization to the transformative reception of Roman law that
produced modern European law.17"
B. CHARACTERIZING AMERICAN DISTINCTIVENESS
When we discount for exaggerated notions of American unique-
ness and for the enticements of cultural nostalgia, America is
different and some things have changed. Beneath the illusion and
caricature of these "only in America" and "good old days" fantasies
lie genuine and serious questions about the distinctive character of
American legal life.
The nostalgic component of the jaundiced view points to real
changes as well as imaginary ones. Before World War II, American
law in practice provided little remedy for have-nots against
dominant groups. Lawrence Friedman described the late nine-
teenth century tort system as a "system of non-compensation" in
which few claims were brought and plaintiffs faced an array of
doctrinal, practical, and cultural barriers to recovery.174 Studying
personal injury cases in New York City over a forty-year period,
Randolph Bergstrom concludes that "[tihe injured had few reasons
to think that lawsuits would offer a ready source of sustenance in
1870, less still in 1910."175 My own review of pre-World War II
173 Eg., Wiegand, supra note 167, at 230. Cf J. Gillis Wetter, The Case for International
Law Schools and an International Legal Profession, 29 INTIL & COMP. L Q. 206, 217 (1980)
(suggesting that we are living in midst of a "singular movement," comparable to reception
of Roman law in Europe, which is characterized by "the adoption and absorption throughout
the world of a less clearly defined legal heritage in which many characteristic elements can
be traced back to the common law, with an American flavour). Wiegand elaborates his
observations in Wolfgang Wiegand, Reception of American Law in Europe-A Second
Thought, (unpublished paper presented at the Conference on Legal Cultures and the Legal
Profession, Berkeley, California, May 7-8, 1993).
.7. Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Iqury Law in the Late 19th Century,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RE. J. 351,355 (1987); see also Lawrence M. Friedman & Thomas D.
Russell, More Civil Wrongs: Personal Iqjury Litigation, 1901-1910, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
295(1990).17 5 RANDOLPH E. BRGaSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAw IN NEW YORK CITY,
1870-1910, at 157 (1992).
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disasters shows that compensation was uncertain and meager.17
Successful claims by those in subordinate positions-workers,
minorities, prisoners-against bosses and authorities were few and
far between.
In this respect, law has changed. Compensation for many of life's
troubles has become routine, through social insurance (ranging
from social security disability payments to federal insurance of
bank deposits) and through use of the litigation system. 177
Expectations of remedy and compensation have risen.17 Legal
representation of victims is more available and more compe-
tent.179 There is more "litigation up" by outsiders and clients and
dependents against authorities and managers of established
institutions. The leeways and immunities from legal accountability
of the powerful have shrunk, and there is a sense of enhanced and
oppressive exposure. It is this exposure that excites much of the
reproach of our litigious society. To many members of the elite,
lawyers are no longer pillars of the established order but are recast
as enemies of established interests. Thus a Wall Street Journal
columnist observed that "lawyers are replacing trade unions as the
main scourge of the business community.""l4 In a situation where
many elite groups feel threatened by social and legal changes, the
underlying and ineradicable themes of hostility toward lawyers are
176 Marc Galanter, Bhopals, Past and Present: the Changing Legal Response to Mass
Disaster, 10 WINDsOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JusT. 151 (1990) [hereinafter Galanter, Bhopals].1 A reading of the magnitude of this change is provided by the analysis of Tillinghast,
a firm of actuarial consultants, which has compiled data on the gross cost of the tort liability
system and of other social systems from the 1930s to the present. Tillinghast found that
"[until shortly after World War II, growth in both tort costs and the GNP ran fairly parallel
Only in the late 1940s and early 19509 did the two diverge. TILLINGHAST, TORT COST
TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (1992). Tort costs have risen dramatically from
0.6% of gross domestic product in 1950 to 2.3% of gross domestic product in 1991. Id. at 13.
This includes the cost ofinsurance and self-insurance. Only a fraction of this goes to victims;
Tillinghast estimates 25 percent. Id. at 10. The compensation received is only a fraction of
the economic loses of victims, leaving aside all other forms of las, pain and suffering, etc.
For example, a study of recoveries by victims of air crash fatalities from 1970 to 1984 found
that decedents recovered about one-fourth of their economic lss and survivors about one-half
of theirs. EIm EH M. KING & JA=s P. SMITH, ECONOmIC LOSS AND COmPSATION IN
AVIATION ACCIDENTS viii (1988).178 LAwRENCE M. FUINDmAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 42 (1985).
1
,Galanter, Bhopals, supra note 176, at 164; SPEISER, supra note 170.




available to decipher and explain these troubling developments.
Enlarged responsiveness to the concerns of ordinary people does
not imply a lessening of legal attention to the concerns of dominant
groups. The system is more inclusive, but all parts of it have
grown. During the era of expanding responsiveness to victims and
outsiders, there was even greater growth in legal activity on behalf
of dominant groups: litigation by businesses increased more
rapidly than litigation by individuals;... legal expenditures by
businesses and government increased more rapidly than expendi-
tures by individuals;'8 the large firm sector of the legal profes-
sion that provides services for corporations and large organizations
grew and prospered more than the small firm sector that services
individuals.18
America is a society that absorbs huge amounts of law and
lawyering-both absolutely and compared to other industrial
democracies. Even when we adjust for the different occupational
structure and nomenclature of providers of legal services, it is clear
that the United States supports far more lawyers per capita than
do other industrial democracies.' I would argue that this
reliance on lawyers is the effect, rather than the cause of a
decentralized legal regime in which any activity is subject to
multiple bodies of regulation; where the application of those rules
depends on complex and perhaps unknowable states of fact; where
" Marc Galanter & Joel Rogers, A Transformation of American Business Disputing?
Some Preliminary Observations (1991) (Working Paper DPRP 10-3, Institute for Legal
Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
1" From 1967 to 1987, the portion of the receipts of the legal services industry
contributed by businesses increased from 39% to 51% of a much enlarged total, while the
share purchased by individuals dropped from 55% to 42%. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF CENSUS, CENsus OF SERVICE INDusUES: LEGAL SERVICES Table 3 (1972); Table
9 (1977); Table 30 (1982); Table 42 (1987). Figures for 1967 are estimates from Richard
Sander & E. Douglas Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a
Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 435, 441 (1989).
1 1 GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 155, at ch. 4; Sander & Williams, supra note 182.
m Marc Galanter, Ad'udication, Litigation and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 151, 166 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds., 1986). A calculation that the U.S.
has fewer "law providers" per capita than many other nations, Ray August, The Mythical
Kingdom of Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 72, is seriously flawed. See Marc Galanter,
Re-entering the Mythical Kingdom, A.BJ. J., Nov. 1992, at 118. Based on international data
on enrollment in law courses, it makes insufficient adjustment for differential rates at which




decision-makers produce not definitive and immutable rulings but
contingent temporary resolutions that are open to further chal-
lenge; where outcomes are subject to contestation in multiple
forums by an expanding legion of organized and persistent players
who invest increasing amounts in more technically sophisticated
legal services. The allegiance of the lawyers that provide these
services is less to their guild than to their clients, whose views they
absorb and whose interests they champion. Mark Osiel points out
that American lawyers are different not only in their "unqualified
partisanship" but also in the kind of knowledge that comprises
their expertise.lS They provide not only technical mastery of
legal texts but "practicaljudgement: discernment in predicting how
courts will balance, in light of underlying policy and principle, the
relative significance of particular features of a complex factual
configuration.""18 The distinctive scope and role of American
lawyers underlies their prominence in the American political and
cultural scene. As the myth of lawyers undermining American
competitiveness attests, they are seen as major actors responsible
for major problems.
Through this decentralized, endlessly receptive, and very
expensive system, we attempt to pursue our multiple and colliding
individual and social visions of substantive justice.'87 We want
our legal institutions to yield both comprehensive policy embodying
shared public values and facilities for the relentless pursuit of
individual interests. But we are suspicious of the concentrated
authority required for the former and reluctant to support the
elaborated public machinery required to provide the latter routinely
18 Mark Osiel, Historical Roots of Adversarial Legalism (May, 1993) (unpublished
remarks at Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago). Mark Osiel
observes that 'The especially stringent duties of client loyalty now widely taken for granted
by American lawyers, and embodied in their ethics codes, developed from the alliance struck
in the late 19th century between large law firms and large companies." Id.
Id. See also Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats and Entrepreneurs,
108 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2056-64 (1990).
' Atiyah and Summers regard the quest for substantive justice as a characteristic
distinguishing American law from English law. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM
AND SUBSTANCE INANGWO-AMERICAN LAW (1987). Cf Robert A. Kagan,AdversarialLegalism
and American Government, 10 J. POL ANALYSIS & MGmr. 369, 392 (1991) (observing the
inherent mismatch of attempting 'to articulate and implement the socially transformative
policies of an activist, regulatory welfare state through the legal structures of a reactive,
decentralized, nonhierarchical governmental system').
[Vol. 28:633678
PREDATORS AND PARASITES
to ordinary citizens. We prefer fragmented government and
reactive legal institutions with limited resources, so that in large
measure both the making of public policy and the vindication of
individual claims are delegated to the parties themselves who are
left to fend according to their own resources. In such a complex
system, lawyers form a major component of these resources. But
lawyers, each attached to her own client, cannot fulfill the fatally
divided promise of substantive justice.1"
Does this more capacious and more complex law bring with it
more justice? Surely, yes, but paradoxically it is simultaneously
accompanied by an increase in injustice. Injustice is something bad
that someone ought to do something about. As the risks of
everyday life have declined dramatically, there is a widespread
sense that science, technology, and government can produce
solutions for many of the remaining problems."8 9 As more things
are capable of being done by human institutions, the line between
what is seen as unavoidable misfortune and what is seen asimposed injustice shifts." The realm of injustice is enlarged.
Hurricanes are misfortunes; but inadequate warning, insufficient
preparation, and bungled relief efforts may be injustices. Once,
having an incurable disease was an unalterable misfortune; now a
perception of treatment withheld or insufficient vigor in pursuing
a cure can give rise to a claim of injustice. As the scope of possible
interventions broadens, more and more terrible things become
defined by the incidence of potential intervention. Thus, poverty,
disease, and disability are not unalterable fate, but a matter of
appropriate interventions. Our consciousness of injustice increases,
not because the world is a worse place, but because it is in
important ways a better, more just place.
Just as our longer and healthier lives call for more medical
attention, every addition to human capacity for control and remedy
enlarges the legal world. It can safely be predicted that health care
delivery, genetic engineering, and the information superhigh-
way-to pick just a few matters from today's headlines-will, at the
same time that they address old needs, spawn vast thickets of new
M Post, aupra note 9.
1 FRIEDMAN, supra note 178, at 42.
"0 JUDITH N. SHKUAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 5 (1990).
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law and create new needs. As resources increase and expectations
rise and new claims for remedy are vindicated, new vistas of
injustice unfold.
The American legal setting-in which decisions responding to
claims based on our competing commitments are fragmented among
multiple regulators, superintended but not controlled by indepen-
dent courts-gives full play to the ambiguities and strains in the
lawyer role. As lawyers devise more complex public structures and
embellish innovative pursuit of conflicting client interests within
and around those public structures, the inevitable tensions of the
lawyer's role are accentuated. Lawyers seem to be ushering us ever
further from the legal idyll of substantive justice that is direct,
simple, and accessible. It comes as no surprise that they are
blamed for both a surfeit of law and a shortage of justice.
How distinctive are these American developments? Is America
on an idiosyncratic detour, or is it launched on a pioneering
excursion into territory that will soon be common ground? Will this
fluid, flexible, ubiquitous law, responsive to enhanced expectations
for justice, prove to have a general and transforming appeal in
other societies in the way that the (now transnational) consumer
culture has? Or will these American formations turn out to be just
one of the legal idioms through which the life of modem societies
can be conducted?
Some would take the extensive borrowing of American institu-
tions and devices as an indication that America is leading the way
to a convergent transnational legal culture. But legal cultures, like
languages, can absorb huge amounts of foreign material while
preserving a distinctive structure and flavor. Yet even as the
various legal cultures remain distinct, they seem to be driven by
similar demands to address many of the same problems and
increasingly they draw upon a common repertoire of responses.
The enlargement of the legal world is not an exclusively Amer-
ican phenomenon, but a general one.191 Other nations seem to be
moving toward this soft, pluralized, participative, expensive law,
with more lawyers who play a more central and expansive role.1"
As these lawyers become more adaptable and more useful to an




enlarged cast of legal actors, they may well join their American
counterparts as targets of discontent.
Anti-lawyer feeling varies in both intensity and focus. Of course,
episodes of elevated anti-lawyer feeling are never entirely new; they
draw on old themes. But they are never just reruns. Such episodes
are about more than lawyers: they are about people's responses to
the legal system and the wider society in which it is set. The level
of discontent with lawyers may be sharply elevated and intensified
by groundless panic about the legal system. The most recent round
of American lawyer-bashing exhibits elite reaction to the pervasive-
ness and expense of law and to its new inclusiveness and account-
ability. This "too much law" critique supplanted the earlier "not
enough justice" critique that focused on lawyers' betrayal of their
public duties. To my knowledge, no prescient analyst predicted this
shift in the most visible and vehement critique of the legal
profession. This should induce modesty about imagining that we
know what is coming next. None of the basic themes of criticism
is going to disappear, since they are rooted in the lawyer's role. As
we expect ever more of the law and become ever more aware of its
shortcomings,1 the focus of discontent with lawyers may shift
once again, but there is little reason to think that its intensity will
abate more than temporarily.
m See HART SURVEY, supra note 110, at 4-5 (reporting that those most knowledgeable
about the system are most negative toward lawyers).
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